

Exercise 10 in Cryptography - Proposed Solution -

Prof. Dr. Rudolf Mathar, Henning Maier, Jose Angel Leon Calvo
2015-07-09

Solution of Problem 32

MITM attack can be easily avoided if:

given $p = 2q + 1$, p and q prime \implies

$\implies a^q = a^{\frac{p-1}{2}}$ has order 2, since $(a^{\frac{p-1}{2}})^2 \equiv a^{p-1} \equiv 1$ using Fermat theorem.

Now using the scheme of DH key-exchange:

$$\begin{array}{l} A \xrightarrow{a^x} O \xrightarrow{a^{xq}} B \\ A \xleftarrow{a^{yq}} O \xleftarrow{a^y} B \end{array} \implies \text{common key: } a^{xyq} = (a^q)^{xy}$$

$$a^q \text{ has order 2} \implies a^q \in \{-1, 1\} \implies a^{qxy} \in \{-1, 1\}.$$

Therefore, as a counter measure, we just need to check if:

$$\text{key} = \pm 1$$

Solution of Problem 33

Shamir's no-key protocol with the parameters: $p = 31337$, $a = 9999$, $b = 1011$, $m = 3567$.

a)

$$c_1 = m^a \pmod p = 3567^{9999} \pmod{31337} \equiv 6399 \tag{1}$$

$$c_2 = c_1^b \pmod p = 6399^{1011} \pmod{31337} \equiv 29872 \text{ (given by hint)} \tag{2}$$

$$c_3 = c_2^{a^{-1}} \pmod p = 29872^{14767} \pmod{31337} \equiv 24982 \tag{3}$$

To compute c_1 we use the square-and-multiply algorithm (SAM) (in chart):

The binary representation of $a = 9999$ is 10011100001111_2 .

Hint: If your calculator can not convert a large number \implies convert it by hand.

For illustration, we can represent the exponentiation in terms of squareings by:

$$m^a \equiv (\dots (m^1)^2 m^0)^2 m^0)^2 m^1)^2 m^1)^2 m^1)^2 m^0)^2 m^0)^2 m^0)^2 m^0)^2 m^1)^2 m^1)^2 m^1)^2 m^1 \pmod p$$

| op | exp | modulo |
|----|-----|--------|
| 1 | 1 | 3567 |
| S | 0 | 667 |
| S | 0 | 6171 |
| SM | 1 | 13498 |
| SM | 1 | 23177 |
| SM | 1 | 3298 |
| S | 0 | 2865 |
| S | 0 | 29268 |
| S | 0 | 18929 |
| S | 0 | 31120 |
| SM | 1 | 143 |
| SM | 1 | 20384 |
| SM | 1 | 30182 |
| SM | 1 | 6399 |

Hint: Feel free to implement the SAM in order to check your results.

To compute a^{-1} modulo $p - 1$, we use the EEA:

$$31336 = 3 \cdot 9999 + 1339$$

$$9999 = 7 \cdot 1339 + 626$$

$$1339 = 2 \cdot 626 + 87$$

$$626 = 7 \cdot 87 + 17$$

$$87 = 5 \cdot 17 + 2$$

$$17 = 8 \cdot 2 + 1 \Rightarrow \gcd(31336, 9999) = 1$$

To compute the inverse of a , we reorganize the last equation w.r.t. the remainder one and substitute the factors backwards:

$$1 = 17 - 8 \cdot 2$$

$$= 17 - 8 \cdot (87 - 5 \cdot 17) = 41 \cdot 17 - 8 \cdot 87$$

$$= 41 \cdot 626 - 295 \cdot 87$$

$$= 631 \cdot 626 - 295 \cdot 1339$$

$$= 631 \cdot 9999 - 4712 \cdot 1339$$

$$= \underbrace{14767}_{a^{-1}} \cdot \underbrace{9999}_a - 4712 \cdot 31336$$

Hint: Check if result is equal to one in each step!

The computation of $c_2^{a^{-1}} \bmod p = 29872^{14767} \bmod 31337$ with SAM provides:

| op | exp | modulo |
|----|-----|--------|
| 1 | 1 | 29872 |
| SM | 1 | 9607 |
| SM | 1 | 15639 |
| S | 0 | 24373 |
| S | 0 | 18957 |
| SM | 1 | 16656 |
| SM | 1 | 26421 |
| S | 0 | 6229 |
| SM | 1 | 8290 |
| S | 0 | 2059 |
| SM | 1 | 28387 |
| SM | 1 | 13917 |
| SM | 1 | 9317 |
| SM | 1 | 24982 |

Solution of Problem 34

a) The public parameters and the received ciphertext are:

- $e = d^{-1} \pmod{\varphi(n)}$,
- $n = pq$,
- $c = m^e \pmod{n}$.

The plaintext m is not relatively prime to n , i.e., $p \mid m$ or $q \mid m$ and $p \neq q$.

Hence, $\gcd(m, n) \in \{p, q\}$ holds. The $\gcd(m, n)$ can be easily computed such that both primes can be calculated by either $q = \frac{n}{p}$ or $p = \frac{n}{q}$.

The private key d can be computed since the factorization of $n = pq$ is known.

$$d = e^{-1} \pmod{\varphi(pq)} = e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}.$$

This inverse is computed using the extended Euclidean algorithm.

b) m, n have common divisors.

The number of relatively prime numbers to n are $\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1) = pq - (p+q) + 1$.

$$P(\gcd(m, n) = 1) = \frac{\varphi(n)}{n-1}.$$

The complementary probability is computed by:

$$\begin{aligned} P = P(\gcd(m, n) \neq 1) &= 1 - \frac{\varphi(n)}{n-1} = \frac{n-1-\varphi(n)}{n-1} \\ &= \frac{pq - pq + p + q - 2}{pq-1} = \frac{p+q-2}{pq-1}. \end{aligned}$$

c) $n : 1024 \text{ Bits} \Rightarrow p \approx \sqrt{n} = 2^{512}, q \approx \sqrt{n} = 2^{512}$. From (b) we compute:

$$P = \frac{2^{512} + 2^{512} - 2}{2^{1024} - 1} = \frac{2^{513} - 2}{2^{1024} - 1} \approx 2^{-511} = (2^{-10})^{51} 2^{-1} \approx (10^{-3})^{51} \frac{5}{10} = 5 \cdot 10^{-154}$$

In general: $n = 2^k$, $p, q \approx 2^{\frac{k}{2}}$ for k Bits.

$$P = \frac{2^{\frac{k}{2}} + 2^{\frac{k}{2}} - 2}{2^k - 1} = \frac{2^{\frac{k}{2}+1} - 2}{2^k - 1} \approx 2^{\frac{k}{2}+1} 2^{-k} = 2^{-\frac{k}{2}+1}.$$

Thus, the probability that m and n are coprime is marginal, if n has sufficiently many bits.

Solution of Problem 35

Let $n = p \cdot q$, $p \neq q$ be prime and x a non-trivial solution of $x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, i.e., $x \not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{n}$. Then:

$$\gcd(x+1, n) \in \{p, q\}$$

Proof:

$$\begin{aligned} x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{n} &\iff (x^2 - 1) \equiv 0 \pmod{n} \\ &\iff (x+1)(x-1) \equiv 0 \pmod{n} \\ &\iff (x+1)(x-1) = k \cdot p \cdot q \quad \exists k \in \mathbb{N} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\iff p \cdot q \mid (x+1)(x-1) \\ &\iff p \text{ divides either } (x+1) \text{ or } (x-1) \\ &\iff q \text{ divides either } (x+1) \text{ or } (x-1) \end{aligned}$$

and $x-1 < x+1 < n$ holds:

$$\begin{aligned} &\iff p \cdot q \nmid (x+1) \iff p \cdot q > x+1 \\ &\iff p \cdot q \nmid (x-1) \iff p \cdot q > x-1 \end{aligned} \implies \gcd(x+1, n) \neq p \cdot q = n$$

$$\iff \text{either } p \text{ or } q \text{ divide } x+1 \implies \gcd(x+1, n) \in \{p, q\} \quad \checkmark$$