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Tutorial 7

Friday, December 7, 2018

Problem 1. (*Lamports protocol*) Discuss the following properties of Lamport's protocol:

- a) Show that the one-way function is not required to be secret.
- b) Which properties must a hash function fulfill to be usable as a one-way function in the protocol?
- c) Propose a function that could be used as the one-way function, assuming that the discrete logarithm is hard to solve in \mathbb{Z}_p^* for a usable p . Describe Lamport's protocol for this special case.
- d) How can an attacker get access to a one-time password using an active attack?

Problem 2. (*Attacks on identification schemes*) Alice and Bob want to use the following identification schemes. Amongst others they are using a hash function h , some symmetric encryption E_k and some digital signatures S_A and S_B .

- a) Alice and Bob use the following fixed password identification scheme.

- 1) $A \rightarrow B : pwd$
- 2) B verifies that $h(pwd)$ is equal to a stored version of the hashed password pwd .

Describe a replay attack for a fixed password identification. Can this replay attack be prevented by encrypting the password, i.e., Alice sends $E_k(pwd)$ to Bob?

- b) The following challenge-response mutual authentication protocol is given.

- 1) $A \rightarrow B : r_A$
- 2) $A \leftarrow B : E_K(r_A, r_B)$
- 3) $A \rightarrow B : r_B$

Explain how an eavesdropper E can authenticate to A without knowing the symmetric key K by a reflection attack. How can such a reflection attack be avoided? Propose an improved protocol, where r_B is not revealed to an eavesdropper E .

- c) The following challenge-response protocol based on digital signatures is given.

- 1) $A \rightarrow B : r_A$
- 2) $A \leftarrow B : r_B, S_B(r_B, r_A, A)$
- 3) $A \rightarrow B : r'_A, S_A(r'_A, r_B, B)$


Explain how an eavesdropper E can authenticate to B without signing any message with his own identity by an interleaving attack. How can this attack be avoided?

Problem 3. (*Kerberos with ticket granting server*) We introduce a ticket granting server for the simplified Kerberos protocol.

To establish secure *unilateral* authentication from A (Alice) to B (Bob) with a trusted authority server T (Trent) and a ticket granting server G (Grant), we use the following parameters:

- k_{AT} is a shared key between A and T .
- k_{AG} is a session key for secure communication between A and G .
- TGT is a ticket granting ticket to authenticate A to G .
- k_{TG} is a shared key between T and G .
- a_{AG} is an authenticator between A and G .
- k_{AB} is a session key for secure communication between A and B .
- k_{BG} is a shared key between G and B .
- ST is a service ticket to authenticate A to B .
- a_{AB} is an authenticator between A and B .
- Time stamps t_i and validity periods l_i , for $i = 1, 2, \dots$

The sequence of messages to be exchanged by the protocol is provided in the figure below.



Formulate¹ the corresponding protocol and describe it with the parameters as given above.

¹Feel free to use textbooks, www, etc.