

Simple decentralised market-oriented management of OFDMA Femto-cells

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
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- Femto access points (FAP) are “do it yourself” home “base stations” attached to a “normal” cell of a cellular network
- They can improve indoor coverage, and increase capacity, for little money (partially absorbed by end-user)
- But they greatly complicate resource allocation and reuse
- OFDMA femto-cells are especially important: 4G networks!
- Challenge: to efficiently allocate channels (with spatial reuse) and power to coexisting macro and femto users
- For the down-link, we auction sub-channels and price macro-users power, and utilise post-winning “confirmation messages” to reuse channels spatially within the cell
- Our scheme can involve real money (service fees), or be implemented as a decentralised low-complexity algorithm


Femto-cells: what, why, why not?



Thanks to femtoforum.org

- femto access point (FAP): **low-cost**, **low-power** device suitable for **home owner installation**
- creates tiny cell (femto: 10^{-15}) **under a “macro” cell** to:
 - improve user experience in **indoor** locations
 - increase **system capacity** for a **modest investment** partially provided by **end-users**
- But their **unplanned**, **dynamic** nature greatly complicates
 - resource allocation and reuse
 - interference control.

Femto-cells resource challenges (down-link)



- M1 to M5 are attached to macro-cell
- F1 to F3 are attached to a respective FAP
- FAP-1 can interfere with F2, but FAP-2 does not interfere with F1
- A channel assigned to FC1 or FC2 could be reused at FC3
- FAP-1 & FAP-2 can each interfere M1
- Only FAP-2 & only FAP-3 could interfere with, respectively, M2 & M3
- NO FAP interferes with either M4 or M5

The free market as a paradigm for algorithms


- A complex technological system can be “efficiently” managed as an “economy”
- The system can be viewed as integrated by many “agents”
- Agents may correspond to actual human beings, or may be machines, or processes
- The system administrator sets up some relatively simple rules for resource use and behaviour (prices, auctions, rewards, punishments, etc)
- Each agent behaves and utilises resources as an economic entity seeking to maximise its “preferences” while obeying the rules and budget constraints (energy, power, bandwidth, etc).
- If the rules are “right”, the complex system produces “efficient” results

Auctions for short-term allocations: Why?

- To **quickly** allocate resources to those that **most value** them
- A terminal's valuation of a resource could either
 - represent the “true” “willingness to pay” of a user, or
 - be a “priority” index computed/adjusted by software
- The Dutch auction format is of interest:
 - Public “clock” displays a progressively **falling price**
 - Eventually bidder that most values object “takes it”



OFDMA management: Basic issues



- OFDMA down-link cell with K terminals
- Bandwidth split into N sub-carriers
- Resources assigned once per time-slot
- Channel-state info at BS enables:
 - Dynamic sub-carrier assignment (NP-hard!!)
 - Adaptive power allocation (“water filling”)
 - Adaptive modulation and coding
- Allocate “sub-channels” (several sub-carriers) to reduce overhead

Market-based OFDMA management

- Just before the time-slot of interest, network auctions the sub-carriers in parallel through a Dutch auction
- When the price for a given sub-carrier is low enough, the terminal that “most values” it sends a buy signal
- This terminal also optimally buys down-link power, given a price set by network
- After purchase completed, prices resume dropping, until another purchase occurs

Algorithmic view

CalculateInitialBids

FindTopBid |{ Find overall highest bid

$price \leftarrow priceMax$ |{ Initial high price

while $price \geq 0$

do {
 if $TopBid \geq price$
 then {
 AssignChannel
 UpdatePowerBudget
 UpdateBids
 UpdateTopBid
 $price \leftarrow price - \Delta$ |{ Decrement price
}

Initial bid calculations

- A terminal's bid determined by its “valuation” of a channel
- Valuation: Benefit minus associated cost
- “Benefit”: “value” of the (additional) information that the terminal can transfer if it wins the channel
- With 1 sub-carrier/channel, & **delay-tolerant** traffic, if term i has **NOT yet won**, it values ch n as $\beta_i R_{i,n}(p_{i,n}^*) - c_i p_{i,n}^*$:
 - β_i : monetary **value of 1 info bit** multiplied by SC bandwidth
 - $R_{i,n}(p) = \log_2(1 + ph_{i,n})$
(**bits/Hertz** with power p & normalised channel-gain $h_{i,n}$)
 - $p_{i,n}^* = \min(p_{i,n}, P)$ with P the remaining power, c_i the price & $p_{i,n}$ solves single-variable equation $R'_{i,n}(p) = c_i/\beta_i$.


Introducing OFDMA Femto-cells (down-link)

- Assume that each FC has at most **1 active terminal** (real FAP can handle only a few active terminals)
- Power price only for macro-terminals
- FAP efficiently allocates its total power to all channels won by its only terminal (e.g., “water-filling”)
- If a FC terminal sends a buy signal,
 - FAP sends an approval message, over both the FAP-BS link, and the air (for interference control)
 - After receiving the approval, the buying FC terminal sends a short confirmation, also for interference control.
- If a macro-terminal wants to buy, all work as before, but BS will not approve if channel is already assigned to a FC

Channel reuse and interference control

- Too much interference at FC if it shares channel with MC
- NO macro \leftrightarrow femto interference because:
 - BS and each FAP inform each other of channel approvals
 - **BS will NOT approve** a MC bid for a FC-won channel
 - **FAP will NOT approve** a buy attempt of a MC-won channel
- Approval/confirmation messages allow **FC channel reuse without interference** under symmetric channels:
 - if a FC terminal can “hear” a FAP, they can hear each other
 - If FAP hears a “**foreign**” **confirmation**, it will **NOT approve** a future buy attempt (by its own terminal) of that channel
 - If **FC terminal** hears **approval by “foreign” FAP**, it will **NOT bid** for that channel (to avoid interference by that FAP)
- NO problem (on down-link) if
 - FAP “hears” foreign FAP but NOT “foreign” terminal, or
 - terminal “hears” a “foreign” terminal, but not the foreign FAP

Channel reuse and interference control example



Suppose F2 confirms a channel purchase

- FAP-1 does hear F2's confirmation and will not approve an F1 buy attempt for this channel (& F1 will never confirm it)
- BS aware (via BS-FAP link), & will not approve a MC buy attempt of this channel
- F3 does not hear the FAP-2 approval, nor does FAP-3 hear F2's confirmation; channel remains available at FC3

Valuation by femto-cell data terminal

- FC terminal has no power cost (uses zero BS power)
- Its valuation equals the value of the (additional) information it can transfer over the channel
- If it has a “long” queue of data, and has not yet won a channel, its valuation is $\beta_i R_{i,n}(p)$
with β_i & $R_{i,n}(p) = \log_2(1 + ph_{i,n})$ as before
- With only 1 active terminal per FC, p is the total FAP power
- If it has already won channels in this auction, bid calculation is slightly more complicated (“water-filling”)

Implementation: issues & non-issues

- Auction **parameters** should be **optimised**, considering
 - **statistics** of the “valuations” (to set max price, and “step”)
 - signal **processing/travel times** (clock tick long enough for bidding/confirmation messages)
- Possible “non-problems”:
 - All participants must be tightly **synchronised**, but this is **already required** in 4G nets
 - **FAP-BS link** must be **fast enough** for operations discussed (home Internet: **10-100 Mbps now** + steady improvement)
 - **Simultaneous bids** are highly **unlikely** because they depend on continuous random variable (channel gains)
 - 4G **standards** are **dynamic**; future new features may facilitate implementation

Recapitulation

- Decentralised sub-channel/power allocation scheme for the OFDMA down-link with femto-cells
- Keys: simple descending-price **channel auctions**, with a **price for base-station power** use and **confirmation** messages for **femto-cells channel reuse**
- Channel **reuse key**: FAP focuses on “foreign” **confirmations**, FC terminal on “foreign” **FAP approvals**
- **Key computation** done **by terminal**: how much to **bid**?; more complex after previous wins (“**water-filling**”)
- **Low complexity**: global NP-hard channel/spatial-reuse power allocation avoided
- Tendency: channel goes to terminal that can transfer the “highest value” of information through it
- Bids can be “true” service fees (money), or “priorities”
- “**Best effort**” **apps** assumed (e-mail, web browsing, etc). **Fix-rate** user must **bid “high enough”** to win what it needs.
- Work is conceptual/analytic. Simulation anticipated.

Bid re-calculation after a previous winning

- For i to evaluate SC n after it has won m , it solves:

$$\max_{x,y} \beta_i(R_{i,m}(x) + R_{i,n}(y)) - c_i(x + y) \quad \text{s.t. } x + y \leq P$$

- If x^*, y^* are the optimisers, the terminal only needs $x^* + y^* - p_{i,m}^*$ because it bought $p_{i,m}^*$ when it won SC m .
- The increase in benefit brought by sub-channel n is:

$$\beta_i(R_{i,m}(x^*) + R_{i,n}(y^*) - R_{i,m}(p_{i,m}^*))$$

(benefit with both m and n minus benefit if only m)

- $\therefore i$'s valuation of SC n after it has won m is:

$$\beta_i(R_{i,m}(x^*) + R_{i,n}(y^*) - R_{i,m}(p_{i,m}^*)) - c_i(x^* + y^* - p_{i,m}^*) \equiv$$

$$[\beta_i(R_{i,m}(x^*) + R_{i,n}(y^*)) - c_i(x^* + y^*)] - [\beta_i R_{i,m}(p_{i,m}^*) - c_i p_{i,m}^*]$$

Valuation after several winnings

- A terminal that has won $M - 1$ bands and evaluates an additional one must solve a problem of the form:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{x_1, \dots, x_M} \quad & \beta_i \sum_{m=1}^M R_{i,m}(p_m) - c_i \sum_{m=1}^M p_m \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{m=1}^M p_m \leq P \\ & p_m \geq 0 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

- The solution (provided separately), has the “water-filling” form: $p_m + 1/h_m = 1/(c + \lambda)$

Extension: Macro/Femto channel sharing (down-link)

- For any terminal, any approval → channel taken
- Approvals:
 - FAP uses max power
 - BS uses power ordered by winning terminal
- Confirmations:
 - FC-terminal sends **TWO consecutively**,
 - 1st uses **max BS power**
 - 2nd uses **max FAP power**
 - Macro terminal sends TWO, each at max **FAP** power
- Interpretation of confirmations:
 - For BS, one confirmation → channel taken
 - For **FAP**, **2 consecutive confirmations** → channel taken

MC/FC channel reuse and interference control

- NO femto-to-femto interference for the same reasons already given under previous scheme
- NO BS to femto interference because:
 - If FC terminal can “hear” the BS, the BS can also “hear” **1st confirmation** from that FC (sent using max BS power)
 - **BS will NOT approve** a MC bid for a FC-won channel
- NO FAP to macro-cell interference because:
 - If macro-terminal can “hear” a FAP, this FAP can also “hear” the confirmations sent by that MC terminal
 - **FAP will NOT approve** a buy attempt for a channel over which the FAP has “heard” a MC-confirmation